Refined Probability of Differential Characteristics Including Dependency Between Multiple Rounds by Canteaut, A. (Anne) et al.
Refined Probability of Differential Characteristics
Including Dependency Between Multiple Rounds
Anne Canteaut1, Eran Lambooij2, Samuel Neves3, Shahram Rasoolzadeh4,
Yu Sasaki5 and Marc Stevens6
1 Inria, France, Anne.Canteaut@inria.fr
2 Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, The Netherlands, e.lambooij@student.tue.nl
3 CISUC, Dept. of Informatics Engineering, University of Coimbra, Portugal, sneves@dei.uc.pt
4 Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany, Rasoolzadeh.shahram@gmail.com
5 NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, Japan, sasaki.yu@lab.ntt.co.jp
6 CWI Amsterdam, The Netherlands, marc.stevens@cwi.nl
Abstract. The current paper studies the probability of differential characteristics for
an unkeyed (or with a fixed key) construction. Most notably, it focuses on the gap
between two probabilities of differential characteristics: probability with independent
S-box assumption, pind, and exact probability, pexact. It turns out that pexact is larger
than pind in Feistel network with some S-box based inner function. The mechanism
of this gap is then theoretically analyzed. The gap is derived from interaction of
S-boxes in three rounds, and the gap depends on the size and choice of the S-box.
In particular the gap can never be zero when the S-box is bigger than six bits. To
demonstrate the power of this improvement, a related-key differential characteristic
is proposed against a lightweight block cipher RoadRunneR. For the 128-bit key
version, pind of 2−48 is improved to pexact of 2−43. For the 80-bit key version, pind
of 2−68 is improved to pexact of 2−62. The analysis is further extended to SPN with
an almost-MDS binary matrix in the core primitive of the authenticated encryption
scheme Minalpher: pind of 2−128 is improved to pexact of 2−96, which allows to extend
the attack by two rounds.
Keywords: differential cryptanalysis · independent S-box · fixed key · unkeyed con-
struction · exact probability · RoadRunneR · Minalpher
1 Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis [BS90, BS93] is one of the most fundamental cryptanalytic
approaches targeting symmetric-key primitives. While its basic concept in an idealized
environment under several assumptions can easily be understood, predicting the actual
behavior of concrete algorithms is quite complex and a lot of research has been done
regarding this topic.
Most block ciphers are designed to iterate a small keyed permutation, called the round
function, with many rounds being performed to build a conversion between the plaintext
and ciphertext. The plaintext x0 is updated by round function RFi in the ith round by
processing xi+1 ← RFi(xi) for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · . The most common approach for evaluating
the effect of differential analysis consists in applying the Markov assumption to the cipher
[LMM91] and evaluating the probability of differential propagation for each round. The
probability of the differential characteristic over the entire cipher is then equal to the
product of the probabilities of the differentials of all rounds.
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Given a pair of differences (ai, ai+1), the corresponding probability pi , Prx∈P[RFi(x)⊕
RFi(x⊕ ai) = ai+1] is searched for each i, where P is the plaintext space, and Πipi is the
probability of the characteristic (a0, a1, . . . , ar) for the entire r-round cipher.
The hidden argument in the above explanation is the treatment of a key k or subkeys
ki. The Markov assumption can be established when the state xi is first xored with a
subkey ki and all subkeys are chosen independently uniformly at random. Therefore, most
analyses are based on bounds on the expected probability of a differential characteristic,
i.e., the probability averaged over all keys. However, the implementation environment
for symmetric-key primitives does not allow to store all independent subkeys, thus ki is
usually expanded from k, and the Markov assumption collapses.
Moreover, subkeys may not be xored in every round to all state bits, which can be
seen in designs of lightweight cryptographic schemes such as Simon [BSS+13], SKINNY
[BJK+16] and LED [GPPR11]. Also some primitives, like hash functions or Even-Mansour
schemes [DKS12, EM91, EM97], are based on an iterated permutation which does not
involve any key at all. In such a case, the evaluation using the Markov assumption may
still give some insight about the security against differential analysis, but never leads to
the exact probability of the differential propagation for multiple rounds.
To conclude, evaluating the probability of differential propagations for multiple rounds
precisely without the Markov assumption is a big challenge.
1.1 Related Work on Precise Evaluation of Differential Probability
Our work then focuses on the evaluation of the probability of a differential characteristic
for a primitive with a fixed key, or for a keyless primitive. It is worth noticing that both
contexts are similar in the sense that the absence of a key can equivalently be seen as the
insertion of an all-zero key. Conversely, a structure with a fixed key is equivalent to an
unkeyed one with different building blocks. For instance, using an S-box S with a fixed
round-key k is equivalent to using S′ : x 7→ Sk(x) as an S-box without any key. Let E
be a block cipher with a fixed key and let ∆P and ∆C be the plaintext and ciphertext
differences, respectively. Suppose that the goal is to precisely evaluate the probability of
Pr[E(x)⊕E(x⊕∆P ) = ∆C], where the probability is taken over all plaintexts x. Besides
the issue of subkeys for multiple rounds, there are several aspects to precisely evaluate
this probability.
The first issue we would like to mention is the contrast between differential charac-
teristics and differential effect. The differential characteristics specify not only (∆P,∆C)
but also differences in intermediate states, often the initial difference in each round, and
evaluate the probability of each section and multiplies all the probabilities. On the contrary,
the differential effect sums up the probabilities of all possible differential characteristics,
thus gives a more precise probability. A lot of research has been done to evaluate the exact
maximum expected differential probability (and the maximum expected linear potential)
in particular for AES, e.g. [HLL+00, KMT01, PSC+02, PSLL03, DR06, KS07, CR15], and
for Feistel or MISTY networks, e.g. [NK92, Mat96]. Those researches are different from
the current paper with respect to the point that all state bits are xored by subkeys which
are assumed to be chosen independently and uniformly at random.
In contrary, our work focuses on determining the exact probability of a differential
characteristic when the key is fixed. This fixed-key probability has been determined in a
very few cases only. The most prominent example is the AES, for which the probabilities
of 2-round characteristics have been determined, for all possible values of the key [DR07].
Alternative approaches can be used when such a theoretical analysis is out of reach.
One approach is carrying out some experiment, which exhaustively chooses plaintexts
P ∈ P and actually computes EK(x)⊕EK(x⊕∆P ). The experiment is then iterated for
several keys (see e.g. [BG10]). The experiment can include any complex event, however,
the lack of theoretical analysis limits its versatility to be applied to other ciphers. Of
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course the approach can only be applied to ciphers with small block sizes, often 32-bit
block sizes, such as Simon and KATAN [DDGS15, CDK09]. Another approach introduced
in [BBL13] consists in computing the maximal expected probability of a characteristic
and deriving a bound on the probability of the existence of characteristics whose fixed-key
probability exceeds a given value. This result can be used by designers to guarantee that
characteristics with high probability are very unlikely. However, this bound exhibits a
large gap between the fixed-key and the expected probabilities (see Table 1 in [BBL13]).
It is then of little use to the cryptanalyst who needs to estimate the exact probability of
some characteristic for a given key.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we evaluate the exact probabilities of the differential characteristics in some
unkeyed constructions. In particular, we provide an in-depth study of the probabilities
of the differential characteristics over three rounds of an unkeyed Feistel network. Most
notably, when the inner function follows an SPN construction with an S-box having
differential uniformity 4, the exact probability of a 3-round characteristic is either zero
or a value which is greater than or equal to the usual estimate with independent S-box
assumption, pind. A more thorough analysis is then provided when the inner function
consists of a single n-bit S-box with differential uniformity 4. We show that, in this case,
the exact probability of any 3-round characteristic with only active Sboxes is either zero,
or exceeds pind by a factor of 2` where ` ≥ max(0, n− 6).
The above analysis is then applied to the lightweight 64-bit block cipher RoadRun-
neR [BS15]. It adopts a Feistel construction and its inner function starts and ends with
the S-box application without applying any subkey, therefore the above generic analysis
can be applied. Although no security is claimed against related-key attacks, the designers
mentioned related-key differential characteristics with 24 active S-boxes on the full (12)
rounds of RoadRunneR-128, whose probability is expected to be 2−2·24 = 2−48. The
designers also speculated that the number of active S-boxes could be reduced further with
more careful analysis. In this paper, we first concretize the related-key characteristic
with 24 active S-boxes and show that the exact probability is higher than the original
expectation. The comparison of two probabilities is shown in Table 1. The attack is
implemented up to 8 rounds and the improved factor is verified. We prove that the
minimum number of active S-boxes is 24 by using a SAT solver, thus our characteristic is
fairly tight.
Finding related-key differential characteristics is much harder in RoadRunneR-80
due to its key schedule. We propose an 8-round characteristic with pind = 2−68 which
are unlikely to be satisfied even with a full codebook, but the improvement with pexact
increases it to 2−62.
We then extend the application of our observations to SPN-based structures with almost-
MDS binary matrices. In particular, we analyze pexact of the differential characteristic in an
authenticated encryption scheme Minalpher [STA+14], which offers 128-bit security. The
previous differential characteristic reaches 2−128 for 6 (out of 17.5) rounds. We show that
for this characteristic a refined estimate of the exact probability is 2−96. This significant
increase enables us to extend the attack by two rounds. The comparison of the probabilities
are given in Table 1.
1.3 Paper Outline
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical analysis of pexact for
3-round Feistel structure. Section 3 applies the observation to RoadRunneR with 128-bit
key. Section 4 extends the application to SPN with almost-MDS matrices in Minalpher.
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Table 1: Improved probability of characteristics for RoadRunneR-128 and Minalpher.
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
RoadRunneR-128
pind -4 -8 -12 -16 -20 -24 -28 -32 -36 -40 -44 -48
pexact -4† -8† -12† -15† -19† -22† -26† -29† -33 -36 -40 -43
RoadRunneR-80
pind -8 -17 -26 -34 -42 -51 -60 -68
pexact -8† -17† -25† -32† -39† -47 -55 -62
Minalpher
pind -16 -48 -64 -80 -112 -128
pexact -16† -40‡ -48 -64 -88 -96 -112 -128
Numbers denote logarithm of the probabilities. Probabilities with † were experimentally
verified. Probability with ‡ was experimentally verified only for the essential part, namely
the probability of passing through S-boxes that are affected by our analysis was verified.
2 Probabilities of 3-Round Characteristics in some Keyless
Feistel Networks
In this section, we evaluate the exact probability of a differential characteristic over
three rounds of an unkeyed Feistel network whose inner function is seen as a single S-box
application. We then want to determine the probability over all possible inputs (x0, x1)
of the three-round characteristic depicted in Figure 1, where the difference at the output
of the ith S-box is defined as bi = ai+1 ⊕ ai−1. It is worth noticing that the differential
probabilities for an unkeyed 3-round Feistel have been previously investigated in order
to determine the smallest differential uniformity we can get for an S-box which follows
this construction [LW14, CDL15]. However, these papers focus on the maximum possible
probability for a 3-round differential characteristic, while we want to obtain a formula
which captures any given characteristic.
Using that x3 = S(x2)⊕x1, we get that the probability of the three-round characteristic
defined by (a0, . . . , a4) is equal to the following probability:
pexact =Prx1,x2∈Fn2 [S(S(x2)⊕ x1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(S(x2)⊕ x1) = b3
and S(x2 ⊕ a2)⊕ S(x2) = b2 and S(x1 ⊕ a1)⊕ S(x1) = b1] .
We will show that this probability may differ from the usual estimate obtained when
assuming that the inputs of the three S-boxes are independent, i.e. from
pind = Prx3∈Fn2 [S(x3 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(x3) = b3]× Prx2∈Fn2 [S(x2 ⊕ a2)⊕ S(x2) = b2]
× Prx1∈Fn2 [S(x1 ⊕ a1)⊕ S(x1) = b1] .
The difference between the two probabilities mainly comes from some dependencies
due to the fact that the input of the S-box in the third round is the sum of two elements,
x1 and S(x2), where x1 and x2 respectively conform to the S-box differentials (a1, b1) and
(a2, b2). Also, we show that the size of the S-box and, for a given size, the choice of the
S-box may affect the factor between the exact probability and the usual estimate.
More precisely, we first show that, in many cases, including when S has an SPN
structure based on an S-box with differential uniformity at most 4, the factor λ between
these two probabilities is either zero or a power of 2 whose exponent corresponds to the
dimension of a well-defined linear space. Most notably, if S corresponds to a single S-box
with differential uniformity at most 4, then
pexact = λpind.
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Figure 1: Differential characteristic of a three-round Feistel network where bi = ai+1⊕ai−1.
with λ ∈ {0, 2`, with max(0, n− 6) ≤ ` ≤ n− 2}, unless one of the three S-boxes in the
differential path is inactive, which corresponds to pexact = pind.
2.1 General result
The technique used in the proof is similar to the one used by Daemen and Rijmen for
computing the fixed-key probabilities of the differentials over two rounds of the AES [DR07].
It mainly relies on the algebraic structure of the sets of inputs (resp. of outputs) of the
S-box conforming to a given differential. These sets are defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let S be an n-bit to n-bit S-box. For any pair (a, b) of differences, we use
the following notation:
XS(a, b) , {x ∈ Fn2 : S(x⊕ a)⊕ S(x) = b},
and
YS(a, b) , {S(x) ∈ Fn2 : S(x⊕ a)⊕ S(x) = b}.
Remark 1. In the following, we will use some relationships between the sets XS(a, b) and
YS(a, b). Obviously,
YS(a, b) = S (XS(a, b)) .
Moreover, if S is a permutation,
YS(a, b) = XS−1(b, a) .
Indeed, y ∈ YS(a, b) if and only if x = S−1(y) satisfies
S(x⊕ a)⊕ S(x) = b .
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Then, we have
S(S−1(y)⊕ a) = y ⊕ b
which is equivalent to
S−1(y)⊕ a = S−1(y ⊕ b) ,
i.e., y ∈ XS−1(b, a).
Now, we focus on the following data transformation depicted in Figure 2:
z = S(x2)⊕ x1 such that x1 ∈ XS(a1, b1) and x2 ∈ XS(a2, b2).
n+S S- - - -?x2
x1
z
∆ = a1
∆ = b2∆ = a2 ∆ = b3
Figure 2: Target structure.
When the three sets XS(a1, b1), YS(a2, b2) and XS(a1 ⊕ b2, b3) are affine subspaces, we
get the following result.
Theorem 1. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 , and let a1, b1, a2, b2, b3 be five elements in Fn2 .
Assume that there exist α1, α2, α3 ∈ Fn2 and three linear subspaces V1, V2, V3 ⊆ Fn2 such
that
XS(a1, b1) = α1 + V1, YS(a2, b2) = α2 + V2, and XS(a1 ⊕ b2, b3) = α3 + V3 .
Then, the multiset
{(x1, x2) ∈ XS(a1, b1)×XS(a2, b2) : S(S(x2)⊕ x1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(S(x2)⊕ x1) = b3}
is either empty or has size 2d with
d = dimV1 + dimV2 + dimV3 − dim(V1 + V2 + V3)
where V1 + V2 + V3 denotes the linear space formed by all elements of the form v1 + v2 + v3
with vi ∈ Vi.
Proof. We first observe that we do not need to restrict ourselves to the situation where
the input differences of all S-boxes are nonzero. Indeed, if the input difference of one
S-box is zero (i.e. a1 = 0 or a2 = 0 or a1 = b2), either the corresponding output difference
is nonzero, which implies that pexact = 0 and the multiset we consider is empty, or the
corresponding output difference is zero, and the associated set (i.e. XS(a1, b1) or YS(a2, b2)
or XS(a1 ⊕ b2, b3)) satisfies the hypothesis since it equals the whole space Fn2 .
Let us now define the following set (without multiplicity)
Z = {(S(x2)⊕ x1) : (x1, x2) ∈ XS(a1, b1)×XS(a2, b2)} .
Then, Z = (α1⊕α2) + (V1 +V2), and each element in Z corresponds to 2r pairs (x1, x2) in
XS(a1, b1)×XS(a2, b2) with r = dimV1 + dimV2 − dim(V1 + V2). We want to determine
the size of the set
S = {z ∈ Z : S(z ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(z) = b3} .
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Clearly, this set corresponds to the intersection between Z and XS(a1 ⊕ b2, b3), which are
both affine subspaces of Fn2 . Since the intersection between two affine subspaces is either
empty or a coset of the intersection between the corresponding linear subspaces, we deduce
that, if S 6= ∅, then there exists some s such that
S = s+ ((V1 + V2) ∩ V3) .
Recall that, for any two linear subspaces U and V ,
dim(U + V ) = dimU + dimV − dim(U ∩ V ) . (1)
It follows from (1) that, if S 6= ∅, we have
dimS = dim((V1 + V2) ∩ V3) = dim(V1 + V2) + dimV3 − dim(V1 + V2 + V3) .
Since each element in Z and then in S corresponds to 2r pairs (x1, x2) in XS(a1, b1) ×
XS(a2, b2), we deduce that the multiset
{(x1, x2) ∈ XS(a1, b1)×XS(a2, b2) : S(S(x2)⊕ x1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(S(x2)⊕ x1) = b3}
is either empty or has size 2d with
d = r + dimS
= dimV1 + dimV2 − dim(V1 + V2) + dim(V1 + V2) + dimV3 − dim(V1 + V2 + V3)
= dimV1 + dimV2 + dimV3 − dim(V1 + V2 + V3) .
Remark 2. For the sake of simplicity, the previous theorem considers a 3-round Feistel
network with the same keyless S-box. However, since the result only relies on the structure
of the three sets XS(a1, b1), YS(a2, b2) and XS(a1⊕b2, b3), it clearly appears that Theorem 1
also holds for a Feistel network with three different S-boxes, S1, S2 and S3, as soon as
XS1(a1, b1), YS2(a2, b2) and XS3(a1 ⊕ b2, b3) are affine subspaces.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 1, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 , and let a1, b1, a2, b2, b3 be five elements in
Fn2 . Assume that there exist α1, α2, α3 ∈ Fn2 and three linear subspaces V1, V2, V3 ⊆ Fn2
such that
XS(a1, b1) = α1 + V1, YS(a2, b2) = α2 + V2, and XS(a1 ⊕ b2, b3) = α3 + V3 .
Let
pexact = Prx1,x2∈Fn2 [S(S(x2)⊕ x1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(S(x2)⊕ x1) = b3 and
S(x2 ⊕ a2)⊕ S(x2) = b2 and S(x1 ⊕ a1)⊕ S(x1) = b1]
and
pind = Prx1∈Fn2 [S(x1 ⊕ a1)⊕ S(x1) = b1]× Prx2∈Fn2 [S(x2 ⊕ a2)⊕ S(x2) = b2]
×Prz∈Fn2 [S(z ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(z) = b3]
Then, either pexact = 0 or
pexact = 2`pind with ` = n− dim(V1 + V2 + V3) .
Most notably, 0 ≤ ` ≤ n− 2.
210 Refined Probability of Differential Characteristics
Proof. Let us focus on the case where pexact 6= 0. We deduce from Theorem 1 that
pexact = 2dimV1+dimV2+dimV3−dim(V1+V2+V3)−2n .
Since pind = 2dimV1+dimV2+dimV3−3n, we obtain that
λ = pexact
pind
= 2`
with
` = dimV1 + dimV2 + dimV3 − dim(V1 + V2 + V3)− 2n− (dimV1 + dimV2 + dimV3 − 3n)
= n− dim(V1 + V2 + V3) .
Since V1 + V2 + V3 is a subspace of Fn2 , its dimension does not exceed n. On the other
hand, when pind 6= 0, V1 (resp. V2) contains at least two elements, 0 and a1 (resp. 0
and b2). It follows that, if a1 6= b2, then V1 + V2 contains the linear space spanned by
a1 and b2, i.e. 〈a1, b2〉, which has dimension 2, implying that dim(V1 + V2 + V3) ≥ 2.
This lower bound also holds when a1 = b2 since this corresponds to V3 = Fn2 , leading to
dim(V1 + V2 + V3) = n. Therefore, we have proved that
2 ≤ dim(V1 + V2 + V3) ≤ n
implying
0 ≤ ` ≤ n− 2 .
The hypothesis required for applying by this result, i.e., the fact that the three sets
XS(a1, b1), YS(a2, b2) and XS(a1⊕b2, b3) are affine subspaces, is satisfied in many practical
cases. Indeed, when an S-box σ has differential uniformity at most 4, i.e., when 4 is the
maximal value in the difference distribution table of σ, all sets Xσ(a, b) and Yσ(a, b) are
affine subspaces (see e.g., Lemma 2 in [DR07]). Therefore, the hypothesis is satisfied when
S has an SPN structure based on a smaller differentially 4-uniform S-box σ: in this case,
XS(a, b) (resp. YS(a, b)) corresponds to the Cartesian product of sets of the form Xσ(a, b)
(resp. Yσ(a, b)).
An interesting observation deduced from the previous corollary is that, in all the previ-
ously mentioned situations, if the exact probability of a 3-round differential characteristic
is non-zero, then it is greater than or equal to the usual estimate pind.
2.2 When S is differentially 4-uniform
There is a specific case where the factor λ between the two probabilities can be easily
lower-bounded: when S itself is a function with differential uniformity at most 4.
Theorem 2. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 with differential uniformity at most 4. Let
a1, b1, a2, b2, b3 be five nonzero elements in Fn2 . Let
pexact = Prx1,x2∈Fn2 [S(S(x2)⊕ x1 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(S(x2)⊕ x1) = b3 and
S(x2 ⊕ a2)⊕ S(x2) = b2 and S(x1 ⊕ a1)⊕ S(x1) = b1]
and
pind = Prx1∈Fn2 [S(x1 ⊕ a1)⊕ S(x1) = b1]× Prx2∈Fn2 [S(x2 ⊕ a2)⊕ S(x2) = b2]
×Prz∈Fn2 [S(z ⊕ a1 ⊕ b2)⊕ S(z) = b3]
Then,
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• if a1 = 0 or a2 = 0 or a1 = b2, then
pexact = pind ;
• if the three S-boxes are active, i.e. a1 6= 0 and a2 6= 0 or a1 6= b2, then either
pexact = 0 or
pexact = 2`pind with max(0, n− 6) ≤ ` ≤ n− 2 .
Moreover, if all three differentials (a1, b1), (a2, b2), and (a1 ⊕ b2, b3) have probability
21−n, then λ ∈ {0, 2n−2}.
Proof. We know from Corollary 1 that pexact = 0 or pexact = 2`pind with ` = n− dim(V1 +
V2 + V3). Since V1 + V2 + V3 is a subspace of Fn2 , its dimension does not exceed n and is
also smaller than the sum of the dimensions of the three subspaces. Since the S-box has
differential uniformity at most 4, all Vi have dimension at most 2 unless the corresponding
S-box is inactive, which is equivalent to Vi = Fn2 .
• Let us first assume that the input difference of one of the S-boxes is zero. If the
corresponding output difference is nonzero, the transition is not valid. In this case,
we have pexact = pind = 0. If the corresponding output is zero, i.e. if the S-box
is inactive, the associated linear space Vi equals the whole space. It follows that
` = n− dim(V1 + V2 + V3) = 0, leading to pexact = pind.
• Let us now assume that all the three S-boxes are active. Then, dim(V1 + V2 + V3) is
smaller than 6. We derive that
max(0, n− 6) ≤ ` ≤ n− 2 .
Moreover, when all three subspaces V1, V2, and V3 have dimension 1, then
V1 + V2 + V3 = 〈a1, b2〉 .
It follows that, in this case,
λ ∈ {0, 2n−2} .
In other words,
pexact ∈ {0, 2−2n+1} .
Most notably, when n > 6, if the differential path contains three active S-boxes, then
its exact probability can never be equal to the product of the probabilities of the three
constituent transitions.
Example 1. Theorem 2 can be verified for instance when S is the AES S-box, which
operates on F82. Most differentials for the AES S-box have probability 2−7. For such
differential paths, we can check that pexact ∈ {0, 2−15}. For instance, for (a1, b1) =
(0x01, 0xca), (a2, b2) = (0xe5, 0x18), and b3 = 0xb3, there are exactly two pairs (x1, x2) ∈
XS(a1, b1)×XS(a2, b2) such that (S(x2)⊕ x1) satisfies the differential (a1 ⊕ b2, b3). Then,
the probability of the whole differential path is 2−15 while all three differentials have
probability 2−7, i.e., λ = 2−15+21 = 26. This factor varies when some of the involved
differentials have probability 2−6. For (a1, b1) = (0x01, 0x1f), (a2, b2) = (0x33, 0x0f) and
b3 = 0xb8, the probability of the whole differential path is again 2−15, while the second
differential has probability 2−7 and the other two have probability 2−6. We then have
λ = 2−15+19 = 24.
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If all S-boxes are active, the highest possible value for pexact is 2n−2 ×
(
2−(n−2)
)3 =
2−2n+4. It is worth noticing that this also corresponds to the highest possible value for
pexact when only two S-boxes are active, i.e. pexact =
(
2−(n−2)
)2 = 2−2n+4. We now give
a simple necessary condition on a1 and b2 for obtaining differential paths with three active
S-boxes achieving this maximal probability.
Proposition 1. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 with differential uniformity exactly 4. If
there exist nonzero a1, b1, a1, b2, b3 ∈ Fn2 such that pexact = 2−2n+4, then there exist x and
y in Fn2 such that the second-order derivatives of S and S−1 satisfy
Da1Db2S(x) = 0 and Da1Db2S−1(y) = 0 , (2)
where DuDvS(x) = S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ u)⊕ S(x⊕ v)⊕ S(x⊕ u⊕ v).
It is worth noticing that, if S is an involution, then there always exists a pair (a1, b2)
such that Condition (2) holds for some x and y in Fn2 .
Proof. By hypothesis, all the three S-boxes are active. Then, pind ≤ 2−3n+6 and we know
from Theorem 2 that λ ≤ 2n−2. It follows that pexact = 2−2n+4 if and only if λ = 2n−2
(i.e., if dim(V1 + V2 + V3) = 2) and all the three involved differentials have probability
2−(n−2). Since the differential (a1, b1) has probability 2−(n−2), there exists x, v1 ∈ Fn2 with
v1 6= {0, a1} such that XS(a1, b1) = x+ 〈a1, v1〉. This implies that
S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ a1) = b1 = S(x⊕ v1)⊕ S(x⊕ v1 ⊕ a1)
leading to
Da1Dv1S(x) = 0 .
Similarly, a2 is such that YS(a2, b2) = y + 〈b2, v2〉 for some y, v2 ∈ Fn2 with v2 /∈ {0, b2}.
We now use the fact that, for any permutation S, YS(a, b) = XS−1(b, a) (see Remark 1).
From the same arguments as for v1, we deduce that
Db2Dv2S
−1(y) = 0 .
But, since λ = 2n−2, we know that
dim(V1 + V2) = dim〈a1, b2, v1, v2〉 = 2 .
It follows that v1 ∈ {b2, b2⊕a1} and v2 ∈ {a1, a1⊕ b2}. This implies that Da1Db2S(x) = 0
and Da1Db2S−1(y) = 0.
It is well-known that there is no pair of nonzero distinct elements (a, b) such that
DaDbS takes the value 0 if and only if S is APN (i.e., its differential uniformity equals
2) [Nyb94]. In our case, S is not APN, implying that such a pair (a, b) exists. When S is
an involution, is also satisfies DaDbS−1(y) = 0 for some y.
Example 2 (RoadRunneR S-box). It is easy to check that, for the RoadRunneR [BS15]
S-box, there is no pair of nonzero distinct elements (a1, b2) such that both Da1Db2S and
Da1Db2S
−1 vanish at some points. We then deduce that any differential path with three
active S-boxes satisfies pexact ≤ 2−5. By examining all second-order derivatives of this
S-box which take the value 0, we have searched for all (a1, b1, a2, b2, b3) such that all three
differentials have probability 2−2 and lead to a differential path with overall probability
2−5. We have found 136 such configurations. One example is
a1 = 0x1, b1 = 0x1, a2 = 0x8, b2 = 0x4, b3 = 0x8 .
Among these patterns, the only one which satisfies a2 = a1 ⊕ b2 and such that also the
differentials (a1, b2) and (a1, b3) have probability 2−2 is the one we will use in the next
section:
a1 = 0xd, a2 = 0xc and b1 = b2 = b3 = 0x1 ,
and the configuration obtained by inverting the roles of a1 and a2.
Canteaut et al. 213
Example 3 (Klein S-box). The Klein [GNL11] S-box is an involution over F42. Then,
there exist some pairs of nonzero distinct elements (a1, b2) such that both Da1Db2S and
Da1Db2S
−1 vanish at some points. For instance, a1 = 0x1 and b2 = 0x2 satisfy this
property. For this S-box, the differential path defined by
a1 = 0x1, b1 = 0x3, a2 = 0xd, b2 = 0x2, and b3 = 0xe
has overall probability 2−4. In other words, any pair of elements (x1, x2) satisfying the
first two differentials also leads to some (S(x2)⊕ x1) which satisfies the third one.
All previous results hold in the keyless setting, but are still valid when the three S-boxes
are distinct permutations with differential uniformity 4. This enables us to cover the fixed-
key scenario since using S with a fixed round-key k is equivalent to using S′ : x 7→ Sk(x).
For instance, in the fixed-key scenario, Theorem 2 states that a differential path with three
active S-boxes satisfies pexact = λpind with λ ∈ {0, 2`, with max(0, n − 6) ≤ ` ≤ n − 2}.
However, for a given differential path, the value of λ may vary with the key. For instance,
the same differential path may have probability zero for some round-keys, and probability
pexact > 0 for the other ones.
3 Application to RoadRunneR
3.1 Description of RoadRunneR
RoadRunneR is a lightweight block cipher recently proposed by Baysal and Sahin [BS15].
It has a Feistel network structure with a 64-bit block size and it supports both 80 and
128-bit keys. In the 80-bit version, the number of rounds is 10, whereas in the 128-bit
version the number of rounds is 12. Whitening keys (WK0 and WK1) are applied to the
left half of the block in the first and last round. The general structure of RoadRunneR
is depicted in Figure 3.
Round Function. RoadRunneR’s round function, named F , takes as input a 32-bit
block Li, a 96-bit subkey Ki, and a 32-bit constant Ci. The constant Ci for round i is the
32-bit value Nr − i, where Nr is the total number of rounds of the cipher as defined above.
The round function in RoadRunneR consists of three subsequent applications of SLK,
which is composed of a substitution layer followed by a linear layer and a key addition
layer. After three SLK layers a single substitution layer (S) is performed. In between the
second and third SLK layer the constant Ci is added (cf. Figure 3).
Key Schedule. The key expansion of the 128-bit RoadRunneR version chops the key
up in four 32-bit words. The round keys are permutations of these words. Similarly, in the
80-bit version the key is split into five 16-bit words, and the key schedule is a permutation
of six words. Table 2 lists the exact permutations for the round and whitening keys.
Substitution Layer. The substitution layer S consists of a parallel composition of the
4× 4-bit S-box of Table 31 to every 4-bit nibble of the block.
Linear Layer. The linear layer L applies the function L′ : F82 7→ F82 to each individual
byte of the block
L′(x) = x⊕ (x≪ 1)⊕ (x≪ 2).
This construction is known to be invertible in general for distinct rotation offsets [Riv11],
and the designers of RoadRunneR argue that this particular set of rotation offsets has
good diffusion properties.
1 This is the “optimal” S-box 13 in [UCI+11, Table 4].
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Figure 3: Overview of the RoadRunneR block cipher. Left: Feistel network with
whitening keys xored in the first and last round. Top right: The round function F , taking
in as input a 32-bit word, a 32-bit constant and a 96-bit round key. Bottom right: The
core SLK function, which consists of an S-box layer followed by a linear diffusion layer
and finally a key addition.
3.2 Security Analysis by the Designers
The designers claim no security in the related-key setting, due to the fact that the key
schedule uses the master key without any change in between rounds. The designers in
fact mention in the paper that each F can be passed with only two active S-boxes in a
related key attack, with total of 24 active S-boxes, and that this total number may be
further reduced in a more detailed analysis. We stress that no information about concrete
characteristics, such as plaintext and subkey difference is provided.
In the single-key setting, the designers show that the minimum number of active
S-boxes in an active F is 10 along with concrete propagation patterns. The authors
experimentally checked that the probability of characteristics and differentials is correct. In
their experiments they report that, the differential probability does not significantly increase
from the theoretically calculated characteristic probability. Based on this experiment, the
authors assume that each active S-box multiplies the probability with 2−2 and an active
F has approximately a probability of 2−20.
3.3 Applications of our Observations
By comparing Figure 1 and Figure 3, it is easy to see that the analysis in Section 2 can
directly be applied to RoadRunneR when the number of rounds is more than two. We
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Table 2: RoadRunneR’s key schedule.
(a) 128-bit key.
Round Number Key schedule
WK0 A
WK1 B
0 (mod 4) B‖C‖D
1 (mod 4) A‖B‖C
2 (mod 4) D‖A‖B
3 (mod 4) C‖D‖A
(b) 80-bit key.
Round Number Key schedule
WK0 A‖B
WK1 C‖D
0 (mod 5) C‖D‖E‖A‖B‖C
1 (mod 5) D‖E‖A‖B‖C‖D
2 (mod 5) E‖A‖B‖C‖D‖E
3 (mod 5) A‖B‖C‖D‖E‖A
4 (mod 5) B‖C‖D‖E‖A‖B
Table 3: The RoadRunneR S-box.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S(x) 0 8 6 D 5 F 7 C 4 E 2 3 9 1 B A
emphasize that the observations can be applied both in the single-key and related-key
settings. We also notice that the observation does not contradict the experiments by the
designers that verified the probability of differentials within one round. What we are
showing is that even before calculating the effect of collecting multiple differences, the
actual probability of characteristics pexact is higher than theoretically calculated one, pind,
under the independent S-box assumption when the number of rounds is more than two.
In the following sections, we demonstrate the power of our observations with applications
to concrete attacks.
3.4 Attack on RoadRunneR-128
First, we concretize the characteristic having only two active S-boxes per round mentioned
by the designers. Suppose that a 128-bit master key K is denoted by four 32-bit values
and the difference of those values are denoted by ∆0,∆1,∆2 and ∆3. By following the key
schedule described in Table 2, the difference of the initial whitening key is ∆WK0 = ∆0.
Then, subkey differences are (∆1,∆2,∆3) for the first round, (∆0,∆1,∆2) for the second
round, (∆3,∆0,∆1) for the third round, and so on. Four rounds with those subkey
differences are illustrated in Figure 4.
We then choose ∆0,∆1,∆2 and ∆3. There are four S-layers in each round. Our strategy
consists in canceling the difference from ∆1 with ∆2 after the S-layer, which makes the
next S-layer inactive. Then canceling the difference from ∆3 with ∆0 after the S-layer,
which makes the next S-layer inactive. By iterating this, non-active S-layers and active
S-layers appear alternately, and we only have 2 active S-boxes per round.
As a result of our analysis, we construct a 4-round iterative characteristic by satisfying
the following four conditions.
Prx∈F42 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ1) = γ2] = 2−2, (3)
Prx∈F42 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ3) = γ0] = 2−2, (4)
Prx∈F42 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ1) = δ1 ⊕ δ3] = 2−2, (5)
Prx∈F42 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δ3) = δ1 ⊕ δ3] = 2−2, (6)
where δ1 is a group of 4 bits in the 32-bit differences ∆1 and the 4 bits gather into a single
active S-box after the bit-permutation around the S-layer. δ3 can similarly be defined.
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∆0 ∆1
∆0 SL SL SL S
∆1 ∆2 ∆3
SL SL SL S
∆0 ∆1 ∆2
SL SL SL S
∆3 ∆0 ∆1
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∆2 ∆3 ∆0
2−2 2−2
2−2 2−2
2−2 2−2
2−1 2−2
0 0 ∆1 ∆2 0 0 ∆3
∆1⊕
∆3
∆3 ∆0 0 0 ∆1 ∆2 0 0
0 0 ∆3 ∆0 0 0 ∆1
∆1⊕
∆3
∆1 ∆2 0 0 ∆3 ∆0 0 0
Figure 4: Four-round iterative differential characteristic against RoadRunneR-128.
The difference γ0 (resp. γ2) corresponds to the corresponding nibble of L−1(∆0) (resp. of
L−1(∆2)) where L denotes the whole linear layer. For example, when the active S-box
position is fixed to the top in Figure 3, δ1 = 0xf corresponds to ∆1 = 0x01010101.
We note that by setting ∆0 = ∆2 = L(∆1 ⊕∆3), the first two conditions can always
be satisfied when the last two conditions are satisfied. The characteristic is iterative after
4 rounds including subkey differences, and can be extended to 12 rounds easily.
By analyzing the differential distribution table (DDT) of the S-box, we chose δ1 = 0xc
and δ3 = 0xd (or ∆1 = 0x01010000 and ∆3 = 0x01010001). Then, δ1 ⊕ δ3 = 0x1
(∆0 = ∆2 = L(0x00000001)). This configuration satisfies the above listed conditions.
Evaluation of pind and pexact. From Eqs. (3) to (6), pind can be calculated from the
transition probability for each S-box, 2−2, and the number of active S-boxes, leading to
2−2·24 = 2−48.
Recall that for any pair (a, b) of differences, we use the following notation: XS(a, b) =
{x ∈ F42 : S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ a) = b} and YS(a, b) = {S(x) ∈ F42 : S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ a) = b}. By
applying the analysis in Section 2, pexact of the first S-layer in round 4 in Figure 4 is
Pr
x∈XS(0xd,0x1),y∈YS(0xc,0x1)
[x⊕ y ∈ XS(0xc, 0x1)]. (7)
By analyzing the DDT, we obtain XS(0xd, 0x1) = {0x0, 0x1, 0xc, 0xd}, YS(0xc, 0x1) =
{0x4, 0x5, 0xe, 0xf}, and XS(0xc, 0x1) = {0x4, 0x5, 0x8, 0x9}, which leads to pexact = 2−1.
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Similarly, pexact of the first S-layer in rounds 6, 8, 10, and 12 are 2−1, which leads to 2−43.
It is important to notice that this probability is evaluated in the keyless scenario studied
in the previous section because it is not affected by the values of the round-keys. Indeed,
the round-key is inserted after applying the S-box and then does not affect XS(0xc, 0x1)
and XS(0xd, 0x1). Moreover, the S-box involved in YS(0xc, 0x1) corresponds to the last
S-box-layer in the third round and is independent from the key. It follows that, in this
situation, pexact takes the same value for any fixed-key.
Experiments. First of all, we experimentally proved that 24 active S-boxes in 12 rounds
is minimal by using the SAT-solver based tool [MP13]. Differently from the expectation
by the designers, the number of active S-boxes will not be further reduced.
We then implemented the attack up to 8 rounds. We refer back to Table 1 for the
results, which clearly indicates the gap between pind and pexact in rounds 4, 6 and 8.
3.5 Attack on RoadRunneR-80
In this part, we present an 8-round attack against RoadRunneR-80. Differently from
RoadRunneR-128, the key is divided into 16-bit values (A,B,C,D,E) and each of them
can be both the top half or the bottom half of 32-bit subkeys. Hence, constructing
systematic subkeys is harder than in RoadRunneR-128.
By applying the bit-permutation around S, a group of 4 bits for a single S-box will
move to symmetric positions in the 32-bit state. To exploit this fact, we set ∆A = ∆B =
∆C = ∆D = ∆E to make all 32-bit subkey differences identical and symmetric.
We set subkey difference to the xor of two differences ∆X and ∆Z. ∆X takes a role of
input difference to the subsequent S-layer, and ∆Z cancels the difference from the previous
S-layer. Namely, in every S-layer, cancellation and injection of differences are performed.
The characteristic is illustrated in Figure 5, which is iterative after four rounds.
We then choose ∆X and ∆Z , where ∆Z , L(∆Y ). We define δX , δY similarly to
the previous section, namely 4-bit difference in the 32-bit variable corresponding to an
active S-box. Because subkey difference is symmetric, ∆X and ∆Y must be symmetric,
which further limits δX , δY to be symmetric (and non-zero). Therefore, δX , δY ∈ {5, a, f}.
According to the characteristic in Figure 5, we have the following two conditions;
Prx∈F42 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δX) = δY ] > 0, (8)
Prx∈F42 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕ δX ⊕ δY ) = δY ] > 0, (9)
δX 6= δY . (10)
From DDT, there is only one choice, δX = 5 (∆X = 0x00010001) and δY = a, which
satisfies Conditions (8) and (9) with probability 2−2 and 2−3, respectively.
Evaluation of pind and pexact. We first evaluate pind. In every two rounds, there are
seven active S-boxes with probability of 2−2 and there is one active S-box with probability
of 2−3. Thus pind is 2−17 in every 2 rounds and 2−68 for 8 rounds, which are unlikely to
be satisfied with 264 plaintexts of the full codebook.
The mechanism of occurring the advantage of pexact is the same as in the attack against
RoadRunneR-128, but we now have an active S-box at the beginning of the inner function
in every round. Therefore, from the third round, pexact is higher than pind by a factor of 2,
which improves the probability of 8-rounds to 2−8−9−8−7−7−8−8−7 = 2−62.
In more details, pexact of the first S-layer in rounds with pind = 2−8 and pind = 2−9 are
Pr
x∈XS(0xf,0xa),y∈YS(0x5,0xa)
[x⊕ y ∈ XS(0x5, 0xa)], (11)
Pr
x∈XS(0x5,0xa),y∈YS(0x5,0xa)
[x⊕ y ∈ XS(0xf, 0xa)]. (12)
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Figure 5: 4-round iterative characteristic for RoadRunneR-80. ∆X = 0x5, ∆Y = 0xA,
∆Z = L(∆Y ). The transition probabilities in red are those which differ from the estimate
with the independent S-box assumption.
Given that XS(0x5, 0xa) = {0x2, 0x3, 0x6, 0x7}, YS(0x5, 0xa) = {0x6, 0x7, 0xc, 0xd} and
XS(0xf, 0xa) = {0x0, 0xf}, pexact in eq. (11) is 2−1 instead of 2−2 and pexact in eq. (12)
is 2−2 instead of 2−3.
Experiments. To ensure our estimates match reality, we performed some computational
verification of the above differential characteristic:
• 1 round of RoadRunneR-80 yielded 65870 (≈ 216) matches over 224 trials;
• 2 rounds of RoadRunneR-80 yielded 1011 (≈ 210) matches over 227 trials;
• 3 rounds of RoadRunneR-80 yielded 124 (≈ 27) matches over 232 trials;
• 4 rounds of RoadRunneR-80 yielded 28 (≈ 25) matches over 237 trials;
• 5 rounds of RoadRunneR-80 yielded 16 (= 24) matches over 243 trials.
These results are summarized in Table 1.
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4 Extension to Almost-MDS Matrix in Minalpher-P
In this section, we show that improving the probability by evaluating pexact can be extended
to SPN with almost-MDS binary matrices. An example of such matrices is
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
 , (13)
which is actually adopted by Minalpher [STA+14]. The rotated version of the above
matrix is more popular, which can be seen in several designs e.g. PRINCE [BCG+12],
FIDES [BBK+13], and Midori [BBI+15]. Section 4.1 provides an overview of our obser-
vation. Section 4.2 introduces the specification of Minalpher-P. Section 4.3 introduces
the previous best differential characteristic evaluated by pind. Section 4.4 improves the
probability by evaluating pexact and extends the attack by two rounds.
4.1 Overview
Let us consider a 1-column state consisting of four cells of size n bits, thus the state size
is 4n bits. Suppose that the state is updated by an SPN, in which the S-layer applies
an n-bit S-box to all of four cells and the P-layer applies the matrix in Eq. (13). With
this structure, the number of active cells can be two per rounds owing to the following
property: When two cells have an identical difference, the matrix multiplication does not
change the number of active cells and the differential value.
Let us consider the 2-round characteristic shown in Figure 6, which assumes that
Prx∈Fn2 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕∆a) = ∆b] = 2−n+2 and Prx∈Fn2 [S(x)⊕ S(x⊕∆b) = ∆c] = 2−n+2.
pind is (2−n+2)4 because of the four active S-boxes, meanwhile we show that pexact is
S-layer 
Δ𝑎 
P-layer S-layer 
× 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 
Δ𝑎 
Δ𝑏 
Δ𝑏 
Δ𝑏 
Δ𝑏 
Δ𝑐 
Δ𝑐 
2−𝑛+2 2  
𝑆 
𝑆 
𝑆 
𝑆 
2−𝑛+2  
Figure 6: Overview: 2-round characteristic in SPN with single column.
(2−n+2)3 in which the S-layer can be satisfied only with 2−n+2 from the second round.
The state of SPN ciphers usually have more columns, thus the improvement by a factor of
2−n+2 can be amplified, which makes the improved factor significantly large.
4.2 Specification of Minalpher-P
The core part of Minalpher is the Even-Mansour construction in which a 256-bit plaintext
is masked by a 256-bit secret value, and then a nibble-wise 256-bit permutation called
Minalpher-P is computed. Finally, the output of Minalpher-P is masked by the 256-bit
secret value. A 256-bit state is described as two 4× 8 nibble-matrices denoted by A and B.
Let Ai−1 and Bi−1 be the inputs of the round function for round i. The states
are updated to Ai and Bi with a round function, which consists of SubNibbles (SN),
ShuffleRows (SR), SwapMatrices (SM), XorMatrix (XM) and MixColumns (MC), where
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SN , SR and MC are functions from
{
F42
}4×8 to {F42}4×8. In the end, the state is xored
with the round constant. We use notations Aop and Bop to denote
{
F42
}4×8 data after
operation op. See Figure 7 for its illustration.
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Figure 7: Illustration of the round function of Minalpher-P.
SubNibbles (SN). SN substitutes each nibble by using 4-bit involution S-box S.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S(x) B 3 4 1 2 8 C F 5 D E 0 6 9 A 7
ShuffleRows (SR). SR shuffles nibble positions within each row. SR consists of two
shuffle functions SR1 and SR2 defined as follows. Elements in 4× 8 matrix A are moved
according to the table below, and for B, SR−1 is applied instead of SR.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SR1(i) 6 7 1 0 2 3 4 5
SR2(i) 4 5 0 1 7 6 2 3
SR−11 (i) 3 2 4 5 6 7 0 1
SR−12 (i) 2 3 6 7 0 1 5 4
SwapMatrices (SM). SM swaps the matrix A and the matrix B.
XorMatrix (XM). The matrix B is xored with the matrix A.
MixColumns (MC). MC is a column-wise linear operation. As introduced before, MC
is expressed as a multiplication by the matrix in Eq. (13).
Round Constant. The round constant coni−1 is xored to the matrix B. In this paper,
the fact that the matrix A is not updated by round constant is important.
4.3 Differential Characteristics of Minalpher-P
The designers of Minalpher found a 6-round iterative truncated differential with 64 active
S-boxes, which is shown in Figure 8. Note that this is not the one with minimal number
of active S-boxes for 6 rounds. However, if it is iterated beyond 6 rounds, the number of
active S-boxes matches the lower bound obtained by automated search.
Then, we convert the truncated differential to a specific characteristic by fixing the
differential values. By calculating DDT of the 4-bit S-box, we observe that the input
difference 0x4 will be mapped to the output difference 0x4 with probability 2−2. So, we
replace all filled cells in Figure 8 with the particular difference 0x4.
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Figure 8: 6-round iterative truncated differential of Minalpher-P. Filled and empty cells
denote active and inactive nibbles, respectively. Note that we rotated the original 6-round
iterative characteristic by one round to optimize it in our analysis.
Let us evaluate the probability of the 6-round characteristic. Here we assume that
the secret mask of the Even-Mansour construction prevents the attacker from choosing
the plaintext or ciphertext to deterministically satisfy differential propagations through
S-box in the first and the last rounds. The linear part is satisfied with probability
1, thus the probability only comes from the S-box, which is 2−2 per S-box. Because
8 + 16 + 8 + 8 + 16 + 8 = 64 S-boxes are included in the characteristic, the probability is
(2−2)64 = 2−128 when all transitions through all S-boxes are assumed to be independent.
Considering that the security of Minalpher is claimed up to 128 bits, extending the
characteristic by a few more rounds is impossible.
4.4 Analysis of Exact Probability
Preliminaries. Recall that for any pair (a, b) of differences, we use the following notation:
XS(a, b) = {x ∈ F42 : S(x)⊕S(x⊕a) = b} and YS(a, b) = {S(x) ∈ F42 : S(x)⊕S(x⊕a) = b}.
When S is involution as in Minalpher-P, XS(a, a) is equal to YS(a, a) for any a. In
particular, when a = 4 in the S-box of Minalpher-P, XS(4, 4) = YS(4, 4) = {9, a, d, e}.
This is represented by an affine space 〈3, 4〉+ 9, where 〈x, y〉 is a linear subspace.
Analysis of pexact. Here, we show that the probability of the 6-round characteristic is
actually 2−96 instead of 2−128, thus the number of attacked rounds can be extended. We
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begin with the analysis of the simple case; SN and MC are iterated twice in a column,
which is shown in Figure 9.
SN 
Δ 
MC SN MC 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
Δ 
2−4  2−2  
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒:  𝑋1 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒:  𝑋1
𝑆𝑁 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒:  𝑋1
𝑀𝐶 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒:  𝑋2
𝑆𝑁 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒:  𝑋2
𝑀𝐶 
Figure 9: Analysis of simple case (∆ = 0x4). Probability is 2−8 if two SN operations are
evaluated independently, while the exact probability is 2−6.
As shown in Figure 9, the five states are denoted by X1, XSN1 , XMC1 , XSN2 , XMC2 .
Suppose that the 4-nibble value of X1 is chosen uniformly at random. Then the probability
of satisfying the first SN layer is (2−2)2 = 2−4. When this occurs, the value of XSN1 [0]
and XSN1 [2] are limited to four choices in YS(4, 4) = {9, a, d, e}. From the specification of
MC, the value of active nibbles in XMC1 are calculated as
XMC1 [0] = XSN1 [0]⊕XSN1 [1]⊕XSN1 [3],
XMC1 [2] = XSN1 [1]⊕XSN1 [2]⊕XSN1 [3].
In order to satisfy the differential propagation in the second SN operation, both of XMC1 [0]
and XMC1 [2] must be in the affine space of XS(4, 4) = {9, a, d, e}. Considering that XSN1 [0]
and XSN1 [2] are in the affine space, the condition that both of XMC1 [0] and XMC1 [2] are
in the same affine space is XSN1 [1]⊕XSN1 [3] is in its linear subspace 〈3, 4〉 = {0, 3, 4, 7}.
This occurs with probability 2−2, thus the probability of satisfying the second SN layer is
2−2, instead of 2−4.
Application to 6-Round Characteristic. All the differences in Figure 8 are fixed to 0x4.
Round 1. Suppose that the lower half of the input state, B0, is chosen uniformly at random.
Then, the probability of satisfying the SN layer in round 1 is (2−2)8 = 2−16.
Round 2. The SR operation does not mix the value, thus irrelevant to this analysis. The
state BSN0 is next updated by MC and then passed to SN in round 2. Namely,
the simple column-wise analysis discussed above appears in four columns. Thus the
probability that the differences in A1 are propagated to ASN1 is (2−2)4 = 2−8 instead
of 2−16. Note that BXM0 is xored with random state value BSM0 and round constant,
thus the probability between B1 and BSN1 is 2−16. In total, the probability of round
2 is 2−24.
Round 3. The same event as round 2 occurs. Namely BSN1 is updated with MC and then
SN in round 3. As discussed before, this probability is 2−8 instead of 2−16.
Rounds 4–6. The probabilities for rounds 4, 5, and 6 are calculated round by round.
The analysis becomes almost the same as round 1, 2, and 3, respectively because
of the similarity of the active S-boxes positions. To avoid redundancy, we omit
the round-by-round explanation. In the end, the probability for those rounds is
2−16−24−8 = 2−48.
From the above discussion we conclude that the probability of the 6-round differential
characteristic in Figure 8 is 2−96, which is significantly larger than pind of 2−128.
Canteaut et al. 223
Experimental Verification. The probability of the first three rounds already reach 264,
which is infeasible in our environment. The gap between pind and pexact first appears
in state ASB1 of the SN operation in the second round, which is independent of the
propagation in state BSB1 . We thus implement the state update from BSB0 to ASB1 with
the limitation that values of active bytes are sampled randomly from YS(4, 4).
We generated 65, 536(= 216) random values at BSB0 , and 250(≈ 28) values satisfy the
difference in ASB1 , which confirms that the probability of the characteristic from BSB0 to
ASN1 is actually (2−2)4 = 2−8 instead of (2−4)4 = 2−16.
Extension to 8 Rounds. We append 1 round to both of the beginning and the end of
the 6-round iterative characteristic in Figure 8. Remember that the probability of the first
round in the 6-round characteristic is 2−16. Due to the iterative structure, with the same
reason, the probability of the last extended round is 2−16. The extended round at the
beginning has eight active S-boxes. Because the advantage of pexact cannot be exploited at
the beginning, the probability is (2−2)8 = 2−16.
To conclude, the probability of the 8-round characteristic is 2−96−16−16 = 2−128.
Considering that the previous 6-round characteristic has the same probability, we improved
the previous attack by 2 rounds.
Note that a path with probability 2−128 cannot be a straightforward distinguisher with
2128 queries. Here our main focus is improving the previous analysis, and using the path
with probability 2−128 is the same setting as the designers of Minalpher. Moreover, by
combining with similar paths, the probability may be amplified to be greater than 2−128.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studied the interaction between the differential transitions occurring in the
multiple rounds of a fixed-key or unkeyed primitive. We showed that assuming independent
input values for each S-box does not correspond to the actual situation, and pexact can
be much larger than pind. Our general analysis on the Feistel network showed that the
gap between pexact and pind depends on the S-box size and the S-box choice. In addition,
having non-zero gap is inevitable when the S-box has differential uniformity 4 and a size
larger than six bits (unless one Sbox is inactive).
This observation actually impacts the security of practical algorithms. We applied it
to the lightweight block cipher RoadRunneRand the authenticated encryption scheme
Minalpher. The results showed that with pexact the number of attacked rounds could be
improved compared to the evaluation with pind.
Symmetric-key primitives with unkeyed functions or public permutations are getting
more popular due to its lightweight property and can be seen in many contemporary
structures such as the sponge and the Even-Mansour constructions. This paper alerts us
that the resistance against differential cryptanalysis needs to be analyzed carefully.
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